Every moral scenario consists of a triple ( context, action 1, action 2) and a set of auxiliary labels. The actions describe two possible actions in the first-person (e.g., The moral scenarios can be categorized into: 1. MoralChoice-LowAmbiguity The LLM-assisted construction (i.e., zero-and few-shot prompting setups) of the scenarios is grounded Category Rule Refined Rule Description Do not harm Do not kill Do not kill (i.e., do not cause permanent loss of consciousness). Do not cause pain Do not cause physical or emotional pain or unpleasant feelings (e.g., anger, sadness) to someone. Do not disable Do not deprive someone of their physical, mental or volitional ability (e.g. Do not deprive of freedom Do not deprive someone of their freedom (i.e., make a person unable to do something by altering the person's environment or situation).

We study the infinite-horizon restless bandit problem with the average reward criterion, in both discrete-time and continuous-time settings.

Every moral scenario consists of a triple ( context, action 1, action 2) and a set of auxiliary labels. The actions describe two possible actions in the first-person (e.g., The moral scenarios can be categorized into: 1. MoralChoice-LowAmbiguity The LLM-assisted construction (i.e., zero-and few-shot prompting setups) of the scenarios is grounded Category Rule Refined Rule Description Do not harm Do not kill Do not kill (i.e., do not cause permanent loss of consciousness). Do not cause pain Do not cause physical or emotional pain or unpleasant feelings (e.g., anger, sadness) to someone. Do not disable Do not deprive someone of their physical, mental or volitional ability (e.g. Do not deprive of freedom Do not deprive someone of their freedom (i.e., make a person unable to do something by altering the person's environment or situation).

This paper presents a case study on the design, administration, post-processing, and evaluation of surveys on large language models (LLMs). It comprises two components: (1) A statistical method for eliciting beliefs encoded in LLMs.

We study the infinite-horizon restless bandit problem with the average reward criterion, in both discrete-time and continuous-time settings.

Planning remains a core challenge for large language models (LLMs), particularly in domains that require coherent multi-step action sequences grounded in external constraints. We introduce SymPlanner, a novel framework that equips LLMs with structured planning capabilities by interfacing them with a symbolic environment that serves as an explicit world model. Rather than relying purely on natural language reasoning, SymPlanner grounds the planning process in a symbolic state space, where a policy model proposes actions and a symbolic environment deterministically executes and verifies their effects. To enhance exploration and improve robustness, we introduce Iterative Correction (IC), which refines previously proposed actions by leveraging feedback from the symbolic environment to eliminate invalid decisions and guide the model toward valid alternatives. Additionally, Contrastive Ranking (CR) enables fine-grained comparison of candidate plans by evaluating them jointly. Conceptually, SymPlanner operationalizes two cognitive faculties: (i) error monitoring and repair via externalized feedback (IC) and (ii) preference formation among alternatives via pairwise comparison (CR), advancing cognitively plausible, symbol-grounded planning aligned with the rich structure in intelligent systems. We evaluate SymPlanner on PlanBench, demonstrating that it produces more coherent, diverse, and verifiable plans than pure natural language baselines.

As the Large-Language-Model-driven (LLM-driven) Artificial Intelligence (AI) bots became popular, people realized their strong potential in Task-Oriented Dialogue (TOD). However, bots relying wholly on LLMs are unreliable in their knowledge, and whether they can finally produce a correct outcome for the task is not guaranteed. The collaboration among these agents also remains a challenge, since the necessary information to convey is unclear, and the information transfer is by prompts: unreliable, and malicious knowledge is easy to inject. With the help of knowledge representation and reasoning tools such as Answer Set Programming (ASP), conversational agents can be built safely and reliably, and communication among the agents made more reliable as well. We propose a Manager-Customer-Service Dual-Agent paradigm, where ASP-driven bots share the same knowledge base and complete their assigned tasks independently. The agents communicate with each other through the knowledge base, ensuring consistency. The knowledge and information conveyed are encapsulated and invisible to the users, ensuring the security of information transmission. To illustrate the dual-agent conversational paradigm, we have constructed AutoManager, a collaboration system for managing the drive-through window of a fast-food restaurant such as Taco Bell in the US. In AutoManager, the customer service bot takes the customer's order while the manager bot manages the menu and food supply. We evaluated our AutoManager system and compared it with the real-world Taco Bell Drive-Thru AI Order Taker, and the results show that our method is more reliable.

My two biggest complaints center on 1) the illustrative single-step matrix game of section 4.1 and figure 3 and 2) the practical applications of MACKRL. 1) Since the primary role of the single-step matrix game in section 4.1 is illustrative, it should be much clearer what is going on. How are all 3 policies parameterized? What information does each have access to? What is the training data? First, let's focus on the JAL policy. As presented up until this point in the paper, JAL means centralized training *and* execution.

We analyze how dynamic information should be provided to uniquely implement the largest equilibrium in binary-action coordination games. The designer offers an informational put: she stays silent if players choose her preferred action, but injects asymmetric and inconclusive public information if they lose faith. There is (i) no multiplicity gap: the largest (partially) implementable equilibrium can be implemented uniquely; and (ii) no commitment gap: the policy is sequentially optimal. Our results have sharp implications for the design of policy in coordination environments.